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Introduction
Automation related accidents or serious incidents are not limited to advanced technology
aircraft. There is a full history of such accidents with conventional technology aircraft.
However, this type of occurrence is far from sparing the newest "glass cockpit" generation, and
it even seems to be a growing contributor to its accident rate. Nevertheless, all these aircraft
have been properly certificated according to the relevant airworthiness regulations. Therefore,
there is a growing concern that with the technological advancement of air transport aircraft
cockpits, the current airworthiness regulations addressing cockpit design and human factors
may have reached some level of inadequacy. This paper reviews some aspects of the current
airworthiness regulations and certification process related to human factors of cockpit design
and focuses on questioning their ability to guarantee the intended safety objectives.
Current Certification Principles
Certification Purposes and References
According to Article 31 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944), any
aircraft involved in international operation shall hold a certificate of airworthiness delivered or
validated by its state of registry. This is intended to achieve protection of other aircraft, third
persons and ground property while an aircraft registered in state B flies into or over the territory
of state A. Following article 33 of the Convention, Annex 8 to the Convention includes broad
standards which define the minimum international basis for the recognition by states of
certificates of airworthiness delivered or validated by other states. Furthermore, Annex 8 sets
the minimum international degree of standardization called upon by article 37 of the
Convention.
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However, as a matter of fact, the main purpose of airworthiness certification has been the
protection of the passengers and crewmembers for a long time. This is a much more demanding
objective, which has been achieved trough the implementation of national codes of
airworthiness containing the full scope of requirements considered necessary by the states to
reach the target safety level.
Today, only two airworthiness codes form the potential reference for any transport category
aircraft certification: the U.S. FAR 25, and the European JAR 25. Due to the pressure of a
highly internationalized business, these two codes are only differentiated by minor differences,
and can therefore be referred to as a single reference for the present discussion.
Basic Principles
The airworthiness requirements concerning the cockpit, as for any other subsystem of the
aircraft, are not aiming at any "best possible" design, but they intend to specify the minimum
objectives to be matched by an applicant design. This is a very basic principle of any
certification.
As far as human factors in cockpit design and equipment are concerned, the minimum
objectives currently set by the airworthiness code are more or less limited to the following:
• To guarantee that the minimum crew (i.e., after one crew member incapacitation) is
still able to do the job without excessive workload or fatigue (FAR/JAR 25-1523)
To provide the crewmembers with acceptable comfort and protection against outside
conditions, so that they can do their job without excessive effort, concentration or
fatigue (FAR/JAR 25-771)
• To provide the crew with a sufficient visibility to the outside (FAR/JAR 25-7)
To minimize the risks of mistake in the controls use, particularly through a
standardization of the shape and movements of the primary flight controls (FAR/JAR
25-777; 781)
• To minimize ambiguities in the information displayed by the instruments (FAR/JAR
25-1303; 1321; 1322)
To provide the crew with relevant alerting information about unsafe functioning states
of any equipment or system, and to allow appropriate crew action (FAR/JAR 25-
1309).
However, these generic requirements are completed by a set of"special conditions," adapted
to the specifics of each particular aircraft. These special conditions may well include extensive
and detailed requirements for systems like CRT display flight instruments.
Demonstration of Compliance
The methodology used to check the compliance of a proposed design with a relevant
airworthiness requirement heavily depends on the explicit versus implicit nature of the
requirement.
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Explicit requirements are directly expressed in terms of design characteristics. For example,
FAR/JAR 25-781 quotes: "cockpit control knobs must conform to the general shape...in the
following figures." In this case, the compliance of a proposed design is rather easy to check,
and direct examination of descriptive material (drawings, scale models, mock-ups) can be used.
However, most of the human factors related issues are covered by implicit requirements,
expressed in terms of general outcomes to be achieved. For example, FAR/JAR 25- 777 (a)
quotes: "each cockpit control must be located to provide convenient operation and to prevent
confusion and inadvertent operation".
In the later case, the methodology used to evaluate the ability of a proposed design to reach
the objective obviously is the critical part of the certification process. A ftrst possible source of
difficulty is the interpretation of the regulatory objective itself. A second possible source of
difficulty is the acceptable means of compliance with the (interpreted) objective. Consequently
some regulatory requirements axe complemented with advisory material, including interpretation
guidelines and/or indications on acceptable means of compliance. Acceptable means of
compliance more often than not are proven solutions, or sets of solutions, that have been
shown by service history to be satisfactory.
The Test Pilot Judgment Methodology
As a matter of fact, one of the only tools currently in use to evaluate a new design human
factors acceptability in a certification process is test pilot judgment. This judgment is based on
regulatory and company test pilots comparative experience, following from actual or simulated
flight exposure (several thousands of hours for major test programs) in the subject cockpit on
the one hand, and previous experience with existing designs on the other hand. In other words,
this judgment is based on extrapolations to the new design of expertise gained on the previous
ones.
Furthermore, the certification process cannot wait until the first aircraft prototype is built to
start up. No manufacturer would take the risk of becoming involved in such highly expensive
development programs without reasonable guarantee that the projected designs are certifiable.
Consequently new designs are submitted to regulatory authorities to get some "certifiability"
agreement well before a prototype aircraft is built. In this situation, pilot judgment cannot be
exercised in a real cockpit (real flight context) but has to be exercised in a mock-up or some
other form of simulated environment.
At the end of major certification programs, certification authorities are nowadays calling for
operational route proving programs. These programs are the occasion for evaluating the aircraft
in an airline-type environment, including "natural" and artificially induced failures, with mixed
crews being composed of airline pilots and manufacturer test pilots. They have included up to
one hundred flights in one occasion.
Discussion
The history of automation related accidents or serious incidents (see accident/incident reports
list in annex) includes conventional generation aircraft such as the Lockeed L-1011 Tristar, the
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McDonnell Douglas DC-10, and the Boeing B-747. This type of occurrence even seems to be a
growing contributor to the newest "glass cockpit" generation accident rate. This may be an
incentive to question the current human factors certification process of advanced technology
aircraft.
The protection ability of a certification process depends on several factors, including, but not
limited to:
• The adequacy of the requirements in expressing relevant safety objectives
• The adequacy of the compliance checking methodology in use.
As far as the human factors certification process of advanced technology aircraft is
concerned, it seems that critics may be surprised by both of these aspects.
Some Potential Biases in the Current Human Factors Certification Objectives
Airworthiness codes and their objectives are not floating by themselves in the vacuum. They are
embedded in a global aviation safety system, including components such as personnel
certification (selection, training, proficiency checking), or operational procedures certification.
The design and functional characteristics of this safety system reflect specific theories about risk
and safety in the aviation transportation system. These theories are far from being mere rational
constructions, consistent with all the available scientific evidences. They also are historical and
social outcomes, conveying the current fears and faiths of the aviation community.
The cutting up of the different safety codes and their role distribution is a first indicator of
the background safety approach. This is particularly perceptible with the human error question.
On the one hand, it is widely claimed that pilot error is contributing to about 70 percent of air
transport accidents. On the other hand, merely four paragraphs (§ 777, 781, 1303, 1309) of the
airworthiness code, out of 330, explicitly or implicitly address pilot error. This one percent
order score suggests an imphcit assumption that pilot error is neither really associated with
airworthiness nor a design concern, but is much more related to pilot certification and
procedures and operational regulations. As a matter of fact, this is the prevailing theory in the
airworthiness world, and all the publications of the human factors researchers have had little
influence on it up to now, except perhaps for this ironical one: a shift as occurred from
culpability-based theories (pilot should not make errors) to fatalism (errors are normal and will
always occur, whatever the design - so let's reinfome cross-check procedures...and substitute
automation for pilot action as far as possible).
A second illustration is offered by the workload assessment focus in the certification of the
last ten years cockpit generation. Even with the same reference airworthiness code, large
variations generally occur in the selection of items subject to specific attention in the certification
process of different aircraft. Great departures from previous designs will normally be given a
closer look. This is true for technical designs and for human factors aspects as well. The glass
cockpit generation has progressively brought a drastic change to the previous pilot
environment, including two-crew design, computer generated displays, sophisticated automated
flight controls, and flight management computers. These changes presented a lot of challenges
to pilots, such as autopilot active mode awareness, total energy awareness, crew
communication, automation over-reliance, and computer interface problems. But in practice,
one single question stands above everything else: the workload question. An ad hoc
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PresidentialCommissionwasetupintheUnitedStatesin1980toendorsetheconcept.Since
then,mucheffort,researchandflighttestimehavebeenspentforevaluation,ratingand
judgmentofworkloadlevelsduringcertificationprogramsforthepurposeofminimumcrew
complementassessment.
Atthispoint,it isratherdifficultoeludesomeparadoxicalfeelingaboutthesituation.On
theonehand,greateffortsaremadeaboutworkloadcertification,buthereisnorealhistoryof
overloadrelatedaccidentonglasscockpitaircraft.Thiscouldbeinterpretedasthenicebenefit
of aparticularlyeffectivecertificationprocessoncockpitdesigns.Unfortunately,workload
certificationprogramstakeplacesolateinthecertificationprocessthatit ishardtoimagineany
significantchangeinthecockpitatthistime,exceptforassociatedprocedures.(It isnotthe
intentionheretominimizetheimportanceofminimumcrewevaluation,butonlytosuggestthat
itsperceivedimportanceisalsosubjective,crystallizingthesociallyhighlysensitiveskiptothe
two-crewcockpit.)
Ontheotherhand,thereisahistoryofautomationrelatedaccidents,butfarlesseffortsare
devotedtothecertificationoftherelatedesignaspectssincetheyarenotreallyfelttobe
airworthinessmatters.
TheAdequacyof the Compliance Checking Methodology
As already stated previously, nearly the only tool currently in use in a certification process to
evaluate the acceptability of a new design in terms of human factors is test pilot judgment. This
judgment is based on extrapolations to the proposed new design of expertise gained on the
previous ones. Furthermore, as new designs are submitted to regulatory authorities to get some
"certifiability" agreement well before a prototype aircraft is built, it often has to be exercised in
simulated environment.
This test pilot assessment methodology is by nature affected by some biases.
First, it is based on the assumption that the experience of test pilots on previous aircraft is
transferable on the new one. This may not be true for great developments in human-machine
interface design. Secondly test pilots are not a representative sample of the airline pilots
population. They have a very specific knowledge of the aircraft, which leads to different mental
models of the aircraft. They do not share the daily routine operations and the associated
constraints, and therefore the cognitive processes involved at the crew/aircraft interface are very
doubtfully the same for test pilots and for airline pilots. Furthermore, typical figures for the
number of individuals involved is about ten or a few tens and the total exposure time about two
thousand hours. This is to be compared to the frequency of the hunted critical events or
combinations of events, which is more likely to be of the order of one per hundred thousand
hours. And to make things worse, recent studies (Amalberti & Wilbaux,1994) indicate that
cognitive behaviors evolve a lot during the training process on glass cockpit aircraft, and that
the average experience needed for the training process to reach a maturity stage and stabilize the
cognitive behaviors is about 800 hours, or one and a half years. This is by far a figure that no
test pilot will reach during a typical test period with a new type of aircraft. As a consequence,
test pilot judgment will be exercised within a cognitive frame and the typical errors encountered
in testing, which is significantly different from the average airline pilot situation.
Finally, an individual judgment, even from a test pilot, would only provide rather soft
grounds to refuse a proposed design.
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Conclusion
The current aircraft airworthiness certification requirements addressing human factors issues are
expressed in rather general terms, and they are subject to interpretation uncertainties. This leads
to an increasing inconsistency between the certification requirements and the new types of
human-machine interface problems brought in by the glass cockpit highly automated aircraft
generation. Consequently, it seems that there is a need for a redefinition of the objectives of the
human factors certification process.
The current evaluation process for the certification of human factors related aspects of
cockpit design rely almost entirely on test pilot judgment. This method has proven satisfactory
for the past years, although it is marred by several biases. However, the changes induced by
the new design of the pilot-aircraft interface has recently increased the effects of these biases to
a significant degree. Consequently, it seems that there is a need for the development of human
factors assessment protocols to complement test pilot assessment methodology.
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